Beyond the European Army: How the EU Can Become NATO's Capability Multiplier

INTRODUCTION

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, combined with a shift in the United States’ strategic posture toward Europe, has significantly accelerated the political will of European Union Member States to strengthen their defense capabilities, while simultaneously bringing NATO back to the center of the continent’s security architecture. The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy establishes a new level of commitment for European NATO allies (most notably a target of 5% of GDP in defense spending) aimed at enabling a gradual reallocation of American resources toward the Indo-Pacific. 

Within an international environment marked by persistent instability at Europe’s borders, this evolving posture has reignited the debate on how EU Member States and institutions can enhance both defense capabilities and strategic autonomy. Despite increased national spending, structural challenges related to operational readiness and industrial resilience persist. These are further exacerbated by inefficient resource allocation, characterized by competing consortia, limited iteration between industry and the armed forces, and fragmented procurement across Member States.

The EU as a Capability Multiplier

In this context, EU instruments and bodies can play a central role in incentivizing the development of military capabilities across procurement and industry, acting as a genuine “capability multiplier”. The objective is to encourage Member States to invest “more and better” in line with NATO standards, while minimizing duplication and inefficiencies and preserving national sovereignty in defense matters.

Although NATO–EU relations have historically been grounded by Article 42(2) TEU, that align the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) with NATO strategic policy, and in the 2003 Berlin Plus arrangements under the “separable but not separate” principle, there is now a need to operationalize these frameworks more effectively. In particular, point “g” of the Berlin Plus agreements, concerning the coherence of capability requirements, offers a basis for institutionalizing joint investment mechanisms.

The current cooperation architecture remains constrained by intergovernmental political blockages (such as tensions between Cyprus and Turkey) which limit the effectiveness of EU bodies designed to function as military interfaces. By contrast, the European Commission, despite lacking a formal military mandate, has assumed an increasingly prominent role through its financial capacity, regulatory authority, and decision-making autonomy, particularly in dual-use domains such as the TEN-T program.

A rationalization of cooperation mechanisms is therefore required, built around a “triangular model” involving NATO, the European Defence Agency (EDA), and the European Commission. In a multi-domain operational environment shaped by asymmetric threats, industrial capacity, the preservation of technological superiority, and continuous iteration between armed forces, policymakers, and industry stakeholders become essential to ensuring an effective defense system.

Within this framework, structured dialogue between the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), which defines capability targets and military demand, and the EDA, together with its associated instruments (CARD, CDP, and PESCO), would enable the systematic integration of lessons learned from the Ukrainian battlefield, including through mechanisms such as JATEC. This coordination mechanism would generate continuous recommendations for the European Commission regarding industrial priorities and research needs, effectively compensating for NATO’s limited role in industrial policy through the mobilization of EU-level resources.

The Israel-U.S. Reference Model and the Executive Levers

This approach draws inspiration from the Joint Political-Military Group (JPMG) between the United States and Israel, a bilateral mechanism designed to identify strategic priorities for defense cooperation and capability development. This framework is supported by a ten-year Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which ensures long-term investment stability ($3.3 billion annually in Foreign Military Financing) and facilitates procurement coordination and knowledge exchange. At its core, the U.S.–Israel partnership is structured around maintaining a Qualitative Military Edge (QME), defined as a level of technological superiority sufficient to deter and defeat potential adversaries.

Transposed to the European context, the European Commission would function as the executive arm responsible for implementing strategic recommendations through three main levers, aligned with the ReArm Europe / Readiness 2030 agenda:

• Financial Lever: Utilizing the SAFE instrument for short-term, hardware-oriented financing, alongside the European Defence Fund (EDF) for medium- to long-term research and development. 
• Regulatory Lever: Leveraging EDIS and a dedicated “Financial Toolbox” for joint procurement, aimed at ensuring interoperability while enhancing economic incentives through VAT exemptions and standardized contractual frameworks. 
• Infrastructural Lever: Mobilizing the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) to support the development of dual-use infrastructure critical to NATO military mobility.

Towards a European Defence Readiness and Resilience Plan

Despite representing significant progress, current instruments remain constrained by a number of structural limitations. The SAFE instrument, in particular, illustrates these constraints: Member States’ reluctance to incur additional debt, the 35% cap on extra-EU procurement, and bureaucratic timelines that are poorly aligned with rapidly evolving operational requirements.

To address these shortcomings, this paper proposes the development of a “European Defence Readiness and Resilience Plan,” inspired by the precedent of Next Generation EU. Such a reform would unify the phases of research (formerly EDF), acquisition (formerly SAFE), and infrastructure (formerly CEF) into a “Single Toolbox“, overcoming the current fragmentation of collaborative investments, which today stands at a modest 11%.

The core of this model would lie in a Common Borrowing mechanism, leveraging the EU’s credit rating to raise capital on the markets and bypass national budget constraints. Member States would submit National Defence Investment Plans, with disbursements conditional on the achievement of clearly defined milestones and targets. Within this system, the EDA–NATO coordination mechanism would play a central role in assessing the alignment of national plans with Alliance capability requirements.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper proposes a structured model of cooperation between NATO and EU institutions aimed at strengthening the transatlantic relationship while enhancing NATO’s overall effectiveness and reducing its dependence on U.S. decision-making timelines. The model also provides a credible response to concerns among Eastern European allies, for whom the U.S. security guarantee remains indispensable. This model offers an effective alternative to address the concerns of NATO’s eastern flank countries, which continue to view the U.S. role as the cornerstone of their security strategy. The proposed triangular mechanism aims to strengthen deterrence against Moscow while recalibrating the balance of responsibilities with the United States.

In conclusion, this redesign would transform the EU into the “Financial Engine” of NATO’s European pillar. While the EDA and NATO define the strategic direction, the Commission would act as the operational “wallet,” capable of bypassing the “Consensus Escapism” resulting from intergovernmental political blocks. This would allow the United States to implement its 2025 NSS and strategically redeploy to the Indo-Pacific, while maintaining a military presence in Europe recalibrated to the effective operational capabilities of NATO’s European pillar. Nevertheless, significant challenges remain, including constraints related to the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) and the persistent reluctance of Member States to cede oversight in a domain that remains central to national sovereignty.

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