China’s Space Diplomacy: Peripheral Partnerships and the Challenge for European Autonomy

The China space program (CSP) is advancing at a pace closely monitored by international analysts. Equipped with world-class aerospace and astronomical infrastructure, its own satellite navigation system, and an array of ongoing and planned space missions, Beijing is emerging as a recognized space power, increasingly vocal about its astropolitical ambitions. 

 

This analysis will discuss the potential of China-run space activities and explain how China builds influence not only through economic means but also through science-technology diplomacy, and provide recommendations for Europe in China-influenced regional space landscape in light of the development and challenges facing its western counterpart: the Artemis Accords.

 

 

Shenzhou 

 

CSP was initiated in 1956 and achieved the success of its first satellite launch in 1970. The launch of the Dong Fang Hong 1 satellite from Jiuquan military launching facility provided a further impetus for work on the Long March missile family and China’s in-orbit capabilities. Despite the 1966-1976 Cultural Revolution, telecommunications and weather satellites were launched and tested. satellite reconnaissance program, known as FSW project, was also initiated (Harvey, 2004). 

 

This work contributed to later, even if distant, successes such as the construction of its own relay satellite constellation, a manned space program, and its own satellite navigation system modeled on GPS. China also made significant scientific efforts, sending space probes, i.e. to the Moon, Mars, and asteroids, assembling its own permanently inhabited space station named Tiangong, and commissioning world-class astronomical observation infrastructure (Harvey, 2004; SCIO, 2021).

 

In addition to space technology development, the space-related ground industry – both public and private – expands dynamically as well. China’s launch capability is supported by four state-owned launch centers (Visvizi et al., 2024) : three civil-military (Jiuquan, Inner Mongolia; Taiyuan, Shanxi; Xichang, Sichuan) and one civilian spaceport (Wenchang, Hainan). A fifth spaceport, Xiangshan, is nearing completion in Ningbo, Zhejiang, intended for smaller initiatives (startups, university projects, SMEs).

 

 

Peripheral actors

 

China has been cooperating with European countries since 1992, when the Swedish satellite Freja became the first European-made object launched from China. Since then, bigger space actors such as France (ZhongFa satellite), Poland (LEM, POLAR, and Longjiang missions), and the United Kingdom (Sino-UK Remote Sensing Constellation) have benefited from China’s research and production collaborations and launch capabilities. China also collaborated to deliver a joint probe, SMILE, for launch by ESA in April 2026.

 

CSP partners with strong European actors, but its dynamic influence is more illustrative of its activities on the periphery. The cases of Belarus (non-EU country), Serbia (EU candidate), and Hungary (full member) are not merely illustrative but reveal distinct models of engagement within China’s emerging space diplomacy framework. These countries differ in terms of technological capacity, political alignment, and European integration. These differences allow for a comparative assessment of Beijing’s approach.

 

Belarus represents a model of deep technological integration, where early industrial cooperation has evolved into structural dependence on Chinese capabilities. Its space authority, Belarus Space Agency, has been a partner to ILRS since 2023, although Sino-Belarusian collaboration began earlier (Jones, 2023). In 2011, China Great Wall Industry Corporation, a dedicated space cooperation company, won Europe’s first contract to deliver a telecommunications satellite to Belarus – Belintersat-1 launched in 2016 (Hill, 2011).

 

Further plans involve sending another satellite, a student mission, and lunar research.

Serbia, an in-between actor, illustrates a pattern of political alignment without substantial domestic capacity. Its participation in various initiatives (logistic, digital, trade, defense contracts) serves primarily geopolitical rather than technological functions. Serbian Office for Space Sciences, Research and Development (SerbSpace, 2023) signed a memorandum of understanding with CNSA in 2020. In turn, during Xí Jìnpíng’s visit to Belgrade in 2024, cooperation was strengthened by signing the Serbian accession to the ILRS. It is still not clear how Serbia and other participating countries will be involved in and contribute to the ILRS at the current stage (Jones, 2024; SCC&CEEC, 2024).

 

Unlike Serbians, Hungary exemplifies a hedging strategy. Budapest is simultaneously engaging with both Chinese and US-led initiatives, thereby leveraging great-power competition while avoiding exclusive alignment. The country has long avoided a clear declaration of its intention to join any of the agreements (Matura, et al., 2019).  

 

However, 2024, a significant Hungarian entity joined the ILRS independently. The Hungarian Solar Physics Foundation, operating the Bay Zoltán Solar Observatory in Gyula, is the country’s leading laboratory for astrophysics, solar storms, and space weather (Xin, 2024; Fejlesztezi hirek, 2025). Even if Budapest’s close ties with China are publicly known, Hungary decided to join Artemis in December 2025 (Department of State, 2025). In the summer of that same year, Hungarian Tibor Kapu flew into orbit, taking part in the HUNOR (Hungarian to Orbit) mission. This flight was part of the private Euro-American Axiom Mission 4. Previous Hungarian satellites have also been launched on either ESA or SpaceX rockets (Axiom, 2025).

 

Taken together, these examples suggest that China does not promote a universal model of cooperation. Instead, Beijing adapts its space diplomacy to the specific political and technological profiles of partner actors. At the same time, this diversity of engagement patterns reflects a broader lack of coherence in Europe’s space policy, enabling external actors to exploit asymmetries between core and peripheral states, even the EU members. China’s space diplomacy will continue to develop. The Belt and Road Initiative Space Information Corridor is currently under development, connecting companies, startups, and research institutions, including those from CEE, to advance satellite and digital technologies (Hui, 2019). 

 

 

Looking for solutions

 

In space domain, European strategic autonomy can be understood as the institutional and technological capacity to independently develop, operate, and secure critical space infrastructure without reliance on external actors. This autonomy should depend on:

1. integrity of governance, 
2. industrial capacity, 
3. security and resilience.

European countries already cooperate to achieve these goals within the broader framework of the European Space Agency (ESA, 2020). Established in 1975, ESA is responsible for technology development, operational planning, and strategic space mission implementation. It also has its own limited launch capabilities, primarily through France and its South American cosmodrome (Guyana Space Centre – CNES, 2024). To accelerate the path on the EU forum, the Union established a dedicated entity – EU Agency for the Space Programme. Based in Prague, Czechia, EUSPA is responsible for implementation, maintenance and future development of the key EU satellite projects: Galileo Global Navigation Satellite System, EGNOS responsible for supplementing Galileo from on the ground and in geostationary orbits, and Copernicus Earth Observation System (EUSPA, 2021; 2025). 

 

Currently, the agency is conducting large-scale activities to build European space surveillance and tracking capabilities (EU SST), which will enable European countries to develop their own space situational awareness capabilities necessary to respond to crisis and disaster situations (EUSPA, 2026). The flagship project of European activities now is IRIS² (Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity and Security by Satellite) intended to provide secure communication, location tracking, and security surveillance services to the EU bodies, agencies, and governments (European Commission, 2024). 

 

 

Diagnosis 

 

The unified platform of European interests in space is facing structural challenges, risking foreign, including Chinese, influence on the policy performance (Remzova & Karaskova, 2025).

The first issue is governance fragmentation. The lack of a clear framework of authority, as well as the division of resources and competences between EUSPA, ESA, and member states, disperses resources and decision-making. That hinders coordination and creates information silos. IRIS², as an example, suffers from this fragmentation, with overlapping responsibilities and limiting efficiency, particularly in the critical phase of initiating and planning the project.

 

The second struggle is industrial dependence. Despite possessing global know-how in aerospace manufacturing, European projects continue to rely on non-European partners for the crucial launching of spacecraft, mainly NASA, SpaceX, or increasingly India. The programme remains partially dependent on external supply chains and services, undermining its sovereignty objectives.

The limited integration of countries in space might be considered as the third gap. Based on example of EU SST, as a federated model, the local restrictions in full data-sharing reduce real-time operational applications despite the broader emphasis on interoperability promoted by the EU.

And finally, Europe’s space program still lacks a robust military component. Although this is gradually, albeit slowly, evolving, its predominantly civilian orientation constrains its effectiveness in emerging security challenges in a contested political environment.

 

Recommendations

1. Establishment of a centralized space governance mechanism, reducing institutional overlap and interconnecting the EU and ESA.
2. Priority for the development and scaling of independent European launch capabilities through sustained investment, public-private partnerships and internal supply chains.
3. Transition of space services toward a more integrated data service architecture, supported by mandatory participation standards and investments for member states.
4. Expansion of the security and defense dimension of EU space policy by integrating dual-use capabilities: technologies, services, knowledge-sharing.
5. Strengthening targeted pathways of inclusion for peripheral European states, offering them credible alternatives to Chinese-led cooperation frameworks.

Conclusions

 

It is undeniable that China is a candidate for at least co-leadership in space exploration. Faced with domestic challenges, such as demographics and rising labour costs, and international challenges, like the tariff war, it is seeking new drivers of growth. Space sector is one of them; it moreover constitutes significant leverage in international policy – providing scientific diplomacy tools, building development capital in cooperation with advanced partners abroad or transfer of talents and solutions. It also creates the opportunity to influence the foreign paths of implemented technologies, monopolies of standards, and specific solutions, leading to deliberate incompatibilities in exclusive service ecosystems.

 

As a result, space cooperation emerges not only as a technological domain but as a strategic tool. Therefore, China will continue to invest in space (Kewalramani, 2024). 

Initiatives such as IRIS², EU SST, and Galileo are in this place, not merely technical infrastructures but pillars of European sovereignty, resilience, and competitiveness. This outline has important implications for understanding how innovation ecosystems are shaped under conditions of geopolitical competition.

 

 

References

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