Speaking with One Voice: Overcoming Language Barriers Between European Armed Forces

Abstract

The credibility of European deterrence is undermined by persistent language gaps among military personnel, raising concerns about allied interoperability in crisis scenarios. Although NATO has standardised English and French for official use with English serving as the primary operational language, evidence from the past two decades indicates enduring shortcomings in language proficiency and assessments. These vulnerabilities are likely to intensify with the reintroduction of conscription in several European states. Addressing these challenges requires a comprehensive approach: standardised and routine language testing focused on operational military English, expanded and targeted training capacity, increased multinational integration to strengthen informal language acquisition, and the careful integration of real-time translation technologies in a supplementary capacity.

 

 

Introduction: Communication is Key

The assumption of seamless communication is central to Europe’s security posture. Both NATO’s Article 5 and the EU’s defense clause are designed to elicit a coordinated response from European militaries to external threats. That requires flawless communication between 32 NATO member states whose militaries operate in 29 different languages (Schroeder, 2018). Failure to demonstrate reliable communication at this scale weakens Europe’s defensive posture as it calls into question the ability for allied nations to coordinate.

 

However, the challenge cannot be resolved through ad hoc language instruction alone. Past efforts in this direction, although fruitful, have proven insufficient, while the re-introduction of conscription in a number of countries risks further exacerbating the situation as a baseline knowledge of English, upon which further education can build, can no longer be assumed.

 

A reassessment of existing language policies is, therefore, necessary. This paper evaluates the structural sources of linguistic fragmentation, reviews past reform efforts, and proposes targeted measures to strengthen operational language readiness.

 

 

Overview: Why Allies Struggle to Communicate

The lack of a shared language has been a continuous issue among European armies. Although there have been a plethora of programs, teaching initiatives and protocols aimed at resolving the issue for over twenty years, the problem persists and conscription is likely to worsen the situation.

Europe’s training program for Ukrainian soldiers clearly demonstrated the core of the issue. 

 

Although the program has faced many challenges, ranging from a tight schedule to a difference in fighting doctrine, the main issue, according to Martin Bonn, a Dutch brigadier general, “is the translation of words used in a military or technical context . . . Words no one uses in everyday life” (Pitel, 2023). Indeed, even when a degree of English proficiency is present, the highly complex language used in military English differs significantly from what military personnel may have previously learned. This issue persists in European armed forces which have long coordinated with English speaking armies. According to Pavel Witkowski, a Polish corporal serving alongside American forces in Afghanistan in 2018, combat medics relied on simple words and hand gestures while working on patients if they could not think of the right word quickly enough (Schroeder, 2018). The dangers of miscommunication in such scenarios are self-evident.

 

Efforts to alleviate the issue have been ongoing since the end of the Cold War, but progress remains insufficient. In the mid-1990’s, the US Defense Language Institute and the British Council began English language courses in former Warsaw Pact countries, but a lack of teachers and a top-heavy approach focused on officers limited the outcome of the program (NATO, 2005). By 2014, NATO had outlined some language requirements under the STANAG 6001 categorisation (DA UK, 2026), but, because language testing remained underfunded and non-standardised, testing remained lax and often up to the interpretation of local administrations. In fact, only NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), regularly tested newly assigned personnel (Adubato, 2014). It is, therefore, unsurprising that the issue persists to date. A 2024 review of English test results for Norwegian officer cadets found that only 10% meet the required language level to become NATO staff officers, while a mere 41% reached a sufficient level to engage in joint operations, exercises and training (Skilleås, 2024). That the situation remains so bleak in the country with Europe’s fifth highest English proficiency index should be of some concern (EF, 2025). These findings suggest that linguistic interoperability remains uneven even among highly proficient populations, raising concerns about alliance-wide readiness.

 

Overall, European English language proficiency remains unreliable: a dangerous capability gap which is likely to widen with the introduction of conscription in a number of European countries. A 2024 Eurobarometer poll found that 53% of the general population, and 30% of Europe’s youth, are unable to hold a conversation in English (European Commission, 2024). This means that, even though the majority of European countries which have introduced conscription, including Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, as well as Croatia, which will introduce conscription later in the year, and Germany, which may introduce conscription if the threat environment worsens, can count on a high average level of English proficiency (EF, 2025), there still exists a significant degree of variation between individual recruits. For countries like Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania or Türkiye, who have introduced conscription but who do not have a high average English proficiency (EF, 2025), ensuring that military personnel can coordinate with allies would require substantial investments into extensive and time-consuming language courses. Conscription especially represents an issue for language-knowledge retention because it increases the turnover rate in the military and, while recruits may be called up in a time of need, in such a scenario, there will hardly be time for extensive language-refresher courses. Thus, the reintroduction of conscription risks expanding the proportion of personnel whose English proficiency falls below operational interoperability thresholds.

 

 

Discussing Solutions: Teaching, Testing and Technology

The solution to this problem must be multi-pronged. Formal language learning remains central, but to ensure that efforts are applied where they are most needed, language testing must become routine and standardized. Additionally, the role of informal language learning through joint training and deployment has been underutilized thus far. Lastly, translation technologies may play an ever increasing role in aiding communication but they should not replace hard language skills. 

Improving operational English proficiency must begin with systematic assessment. STANAG 6001 criteria should be clarified at the NATO level, to eliminate interpretive discrepancies, and applied at regular intervals to ensure sustained compliance. At the same time, studies show that current language testing falls short of the requirements for enlisted personnel, failing to adequately test for the language which is required in a military context (Grande, 2022), overempathising correct grammar over effectiveness of communication, which penalizes capable personnel (Orna-Montesinos, 2018). NATO should, therefore, adapt language testing to focus more on military English.

 

This test information can also be used to ensure that personnel are given the training which they specifically require. Linguistically capable individuals may only require a quick refresher on military English while others may require additional courses. NATO operates 19 Partnership Training and Education Centres (PTEC) which provide language courses for armed forces (NATO, 2025), but with an increase in the number of conscripts and a greater emphasis on language skills, additional training centres may be needed. Additional capacity should, therefore, be ensured through PTEC, while NATO member states relying on conscription should expect an influx in personnel requiring English language training in emergency situations and should, therefore, ensure that dual use language education centres will be available when needed.

 

Aside from formal language courses, contact between allied military personnel also represents a way of strengthening their skills. European militaries should, thus, ensure regular international exercises. Additionally, more nations should participate in NATO’s multinational battlegroups and set up bi or multi-national units, such as the Belgian Luxembourgish joint reconnaissance battalion, to further deepen cooperation. Such joint deployments do not have to be large to achieve their desired language learning goals as personnel can be regularly rotated through them.

Armed forces can also integrate English practice into routine operations through receptive multilingualism—a model in which personnel respond in their preferred language while receiving instructions in another language they understand but struggle to speak. This approach, successfully applied within the multilingual Swiss armed forces, demonstrates that structured exposure can enhance mutual comprehension without full linguistic convergence (Berthele, 2013).

Lastly, technology offers a crutch for effective communication. Translation softwares, such as the Mission Partner Kit (MPK), which was tested during joint exercises in 2024, offer realtime translation of written and oral communication (Carberry, 2024). However, the efficacy of such technologies should not replace language skills. Translation softwares struggle to convey cultural meanings and phrases while an over-reliance on technologies would leave military personnel without means to effectively communicate with allies should the system fail. Instant translation technology represents a valuable addition to, not a replacement for, language skills.

 

 

Policy Recommendations

• NATO should standardise STANAG 6001 assessment frameworks, developing detailed assessment criteria focused on effective communication and military English proficiency.

• Militaries should institutionalise routine proficiency testing to ensure sustained compliance with NATO operational proficiency thresholds.

• States should invest in scalable, individualised training structures capable of addressing proficiency gaps across all ranks.

• Governments reintroducing conscription should ensure rapid-expansion language training capacity in crisis scenarios by investing in dual-use language training centres.

• Militaries should expand participation in multinational battlegroups, establish bi or multi-national units, and regularly exercise in English to strengthen the informal acquisition of operational English.

• Militaries should integrate real-time translation technologies to supplement existing language skills.

References

 

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