Title NATO's Internal Turmoil and China's Reactivation of the Polar Silk Road

Introduction 

Recent disagreements among the United States, European allies, and NATO members over issues of territorial integrity, sovereignty, and self-determination for Greenland have exposed tensions within the transatlantic alliance. Such divisions within the transatlantic alliance may create opportunities for China to expand its regional influence through the Polar Silk Road, which relies on infrastructure investment, resource development, and scientific cooperation to strengthen Beijing’s regional presence (Lino, 2020).

This paper emphasizes the importance of NATO and the EU working together to strengthen Arctic economic resilience by providing credible investments and addressing security issues to reduce China’s footprint. It underscores the importance of protecting the region and its critical minerals from non-military threats (Cinciripini and Raimondi, 2025).

Understanding the Polar Silk Road

The Polar Silk Road is a component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative introduced in 2018. Its main goals are the expansion of shipping routes, economic connectivity, infrastructure development and scientific cooperation across the region. It is officially presented as a framework for mostly economic purposes; however, it anchors China’s efforts to secure its position in Arctic trade routes, strategic infrastructure and resources. Beijing has adopted a gradual approach that combines commercial investment, infrastructure development, and scientific engagement.

Maritime routes are the main pillar of the Polar Silk Road strategy. China actively supports shipping companies such as NewNew Shipping Line and Sea Legend, which have expanded their operations along Arctic routes. In 2025, fourteen container vessels completed voyages through the Northern Sea Route, demonstrating the growing commercial use of Arctic shipping corridors (Humpert, 2025). The increase in Chinese use of Arctic shipping corridors not only reduces transit times between Asia and Europe but also expands China’s stake in the governance of these routes and its footprint for influence.

In this context, Western policymakers should view the Polar Silk Road not merely as an infrastructure initiative but also as an instrument of strategic influence. For instance, China is continuously broadening its strategic presence in the Arctic, though it is not an Arctic Council member and has no territorial stake. Estimates of China’s potential economic footprint in the Arctic can sometimes overstate Beijing’s capabilities and intentions (Edström et al., 2025). Nevertheless, the cumulative effect of Chinese investments, infrastructure projects, and scientific activities remains strategically significant.

Between 2012 and 2017, Chinese foreign direct investment in Greenland reached approximately 11 percent of the territory’s GDP (Hawkins, 2026). These investments raised security concerns for Denmark, which retains responsibility for Greenland’s foreign and security affairs, as well as for other NATO allies.

However, the principal challenge for Western powers is not an imminent military confrontation, but the gradual accumulation of influence through economic engagement, infrastructure development, and scientific cooperation that often remains below traditional security thresholds.

The Geoeconomic Counter-Strategy

Despite China’s enhanced regional influence through the Polar Silk Road, Western geoeconomic responses have struggled to keep pace with these developments. Recent the United States interest in Greenland, driven by national security considerations, reflects a growing recognition of the Arctic’s strategic importance. However, the US proposal has generated tensions among NATO allies, particularly Denmark, and may complicate efforts to maintain a coordinated Western approach toward the Arctic (FitzGerald, 2026).

On the other hand, NATO’s conventional military capabilities are not well suited to addressing the forms of influence that China increasingly employs in the Arctic. This challenge is further complicated by disagreements among allies regarding how best to balance strategic priorities while maintaining alliance cohesion. The discussion surrounding a NATO presence in Greenland, including the Arctic Sentry initiative, reflects broader European efforts to strengthen coordination and security cooperation in the Arctic (Bryjka, 2026). Such initiatives may contribute to a more coordinated response to growing Chinese influence in the region, although some policymakers in Washington may view them as limiting the United States strategic flexibility. Several European allies criticized Washington’s position, arguing that it risked undermining alliance cohesion and established principles of international law (Kola, 2026). 

But regardless of how ambitious a geoeconomic strategy may be, it hinges on the political cohesion of the transatlantic alliance. Recent controversies surrounding Greenland illustrate growing disagreements within the transatlantic alliance regarding strategic priorities and the coordination of Arctic policy.

Complementary, Not Competing: The European Dimension 

The European dimension needs to become a central element of any effort to establish a holistic Western strategy in the Arctic. Indeed, the role of the EU members (Finland, Sweden, Denmark) is decisive for Arctic security and governance. Consequently, Arctic strategy should treat EU Arctic policy and NATO’s security posture as complementary frameworks that reinforce one another rather than as competing approaches.

NATO remains the primary institution for providing military deterrence and collective defense, a role reaffirmed by the launch of Arctic Sentry in February 2026. Led by Joint Force Command Norfolk and composed of multinational forces operating across the different operational domains, the Arctic Sentry connects drills such as Cold Response and Arctic Endurance, strengthening military preparedness for operations in Arctic environments (NATO, 2026).

However, military deterrence alone is insufficient to counter the expansion of strategically competitive states that, operating beneath the traditional security response threshold, might use investments, infrastructure projects and economic activities to build power projection. In response to these issues, the EU should act as a geoeconomic power complementing NATO’s military role in the Arctic. While some critics argue that EU security initiatives merely duplicate NATO efforts, they miss the nature of the region’s challenges (Blockmans, 2026). Instead of competing against each other, NATO and the EU should coordinate a division of labor: NATO must remain a pillar of military deterrence, while the EU should use its financial, regulatory and economic instruments to counteract the strategic vulnerabilities arising from foreign investment and infrastructure projects (European Parliament, 2025).

Indeed, resisting the long-term development of China’s Polar Silk Road requires a joint strategy in which the military means of NATO are integrated with the EU’s financial instruments, regulatory tools and investment capacity to construct a lasting Arctic strategy addressing the security challenges of the 21st century (Raspotnik and Habeck, 2026).

Conclusion 

The Polar Silk Road illustrates how geoeconomic tools have become central to contemporary competition in the Arctic, complementing and, in some cases, rivaling the importance of traditional military power. While China has expanded its regional presence through infrastructure investment, scientific cooperation, commercial engagement, and access to strategic resources, these activities generally remain below the threshold that would trigger a conventional military response. To address these challenges effectively, NATO and the EU should pursue a coordinated strategy that combines military deterrence with economic statecraft, infrastructure investment, and resilience-building measures across the Arctic region.

References

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